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Abstract 
Introduction: It has been suggested that abnormal perceptual processing and somatosensory 
amplification may be contributory factors to somatoform symptom reporting. A key source of 
somatosensory information is proprioception, yet the perception and integration of this sense 
has not been sufficiently investigated in those prone to somatoform disorders.  
Methods: Sub-clinical groups of high- and low-scorers on the Somatoform Dissociation 
Questionnaire made judgements about the location of their unseen hand following congruent 
or incongruent visuo-proprioceptive feedback, which was manipulated using a MIRAGE 
mediated-reality system. 
Results: No differences were found between groups, with both groups displaying normal 
proprioceptive accuracy under congruent conditions and equivalent visuo-proprioceptive 
integration under incongruent conditions. 
Conclusions: The results suggest that amplification of, or abnormal weighting for, 
proprioceptive signals is not a contributing factor to somatoform symptom reporting.  
 
Keywords: somatoform dissociation; medically unexplained symptoms; proprioception; 
sensory integration; MIRAGE 
 
Introduction 
 Dissociative disorders are characterised by disruptions in the normal integration of 
mental processes, leading to a disconnection between thoughts, feelings, emotions, 
perceptions and memories. There are a number of recognised dissociative disorders that are 
characterised by different types of dissociative experience, including memory loss 
(dissociative amnesia), a sense of detachment from the self (depersonalisation) or shifts in 
identity (dissociative identity disorder). Other types of dissociative experience include 
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autoscopic phenomena, such as the out of body experience (OBE). Nijenhuis, Spinhoven, 
Van Dyck, van der Hart, & Vanderlinden (1996) coined the term ‘somatoform dissociation’ 
to describe a specific type of dissociative experience characterised by the presence of bodily 
symptoms for which no medical or organic cause can be determined. Also known as 
somatisation, presence of severe symptoms may lead to a diagnosis of somatic symptom 
disorder (SSD, DSM-5; formerly somatoform disorder in DSM-IV). While only a small 
percentage of the population meet this clinical diagnosis, the prevalence of somatisation in 
the general population is relatively high; so-called medically unexplained symptoms account 
for up to 30% of primary care consultations (Nimnuan, Hotopf, & Wessely, 2001; 
Steinbrecher, Koerber, Frieser, & Hiller, 2011) and up to 20% of secondary care cases (Reid, 
Wessely, Crayford, & Hotopf, 2001). These figures highlight the importance of 
understanding the mechanisms contributing to medically unexplained symptoms in 
nonclinical populations as well as in clinical groups. 
 Early theories attempting to explain the occurrence of unexplained symptoms (referred to as 
“hysteria”) emphasised the role of dissociation in symptom emergence and maintenance (e.g. 
Janet, 1907). Although later theories focussed on understanding unexplained symptoms in 
relation to normal physiological processes (Kirmayer & Taillefer, 1997; Rief & Barsky, 
2005), current theoretical perspectives offer a more integrated approach, incorporating 
elements of dissociative accounts with other concepts (e.g. Brown, 2004). The link between 
unexplained symptoms and dissociation is supported by research showing that patients with 
dissociative disorders score highly on the Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ; 
developed by Nijenhuis et al., 1996), a measure of unexplained somatic symptoms, with the 
SDQ distinguishing between patients with dissociative disorders and those with other 
psychiatric disorders (Nijenhuis, 2010). SDQ scores have been found to correlate strongly 
with measures of dissociative experience across both clinical and nonclinical populations 
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(Sar, Kundakci, Kiziltan, Bakin, & Bozkurt, 2001), and out-of-body experiences reported in 
student populations are also associated with increased experience of somatoform dissociation 
(Irwin, 2000; Murray & Fox, 2005) Taken together, these findings confirm the relevance of 
unexplained symptoms in a range of dissociative experiences. 
A central feature of several models of medically unexplained symptoms is the 
suggestion that underlying abnormalities in perceptual processing play a significant role in 
the emergence and maintenance of symptoms. Barsky, Goodson, Lane, & Cleary (1988) 
introduced the concept of somatosensory amplification, which describes the tendency to 
experience amplification of normal bodily sensations, such that benign or weak physiological 
sensations are perceived as intense, noxious and disturbing. Increased attention to these 
sensations subsequently leads to them being interpreted as abnormal and a sign of disease. 
Barsky (1992) suggests that this process of body hyper vigilance, attentional focus and 
misattribution may serve as a mechanism contributing to somatisation. Several studies have 
found a link between somatosensory amplification and somatic symptom reporting (Aronson, 
Barrett, & Quigley, 2001; Duddu, Chaturvedi, & Isaac, 2003; Muramatsu et al., 2002), 
although the nature of the relationship is unclear since both somatosensory amplification and 
somatisation are closely related to other factors such as anxiety and depression (Duddu, Isaac, 
& Chaturvedi, 2006). Rief & Barsky (2005) extend the suggested role of perceptual 
amplification in their signal-filtering model, suggesting that misperceptions may arise not 
only from amplification but also due to reduced filtering of sensory signals. This would allow 
otherwise unnoticed signals to reach conscious awareness, resulting in increased perception 
of sensory signals that may then be misattributed as illness. While these types of theories 
suggest that people experiencing somatoform symptoms may experience increased body 
awareness and stronger perceptions of internal signals, other models propose that perception 
is more strongly influenced by subjective representations, which may actually render it less 
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accurate. Brown (2004, 2006) suggests that medically unexplained symptoms are brought 
about when representations are inappropriately selected during automatic attentional 
processes at the level of the primary attentional system. Since selection made at this level is 
automatically triggered, the inappropriate selection does not reach awareness, therefore the 
misconception is experienced as subjectively real despite sensory signals being inconsistent 
with these representations. This overreliance on “top-down” factors leads to perceptions that 
are less in line with reality.  
Several studies have sought to clarify the nature of any perceptual abnormalities in 
those experiencing medically unexplained symptoms, and whether or not the perception of 
bodily signals is more or less accurate. Both the interoceptive and proprioceptive systems 
play an important role in body awareness. The interoceptive sense is responsible for 
monitoring the physiological state of the body (Craig, 2003), encompassing information from 
a number of internal systems such as the digestive, respiratory and cardiac systems. This is 
distinguishable from proprioception, the sense of the body’s position and movement in space, 
which arises from sensory receptors in the muscles, joints and skin (Proske & Gandevia, 
2012). Paradigms investigating both interoceptive and proprioceptive awareness have sought 
to offer some insight into how these sensory signals are processed in those experiencing 
medically unexplained symptoms and somatoform disorders. Using an EMG-biofeedback 
task to investigate proprioceptive abilities, Scholz, Ott, & Sarnoch (2001) found that patients 
with somatoform disorder showed more precise proprioception for muscle tension than a 
control group, lending support to the suggestion of heightened body awareness in 
somatoform disorders. However there were no differences in subjective ratings of perceived 
intensity of proprioception between the two groups, as the amplification account would 
predict. Findings from other studies have suggested that bodily perceptions are less accurate 
in those experiencing somatic symptoms. Bogaerts et al. (2008, 2010) used the Rebreathing 
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Test to induce mild respiratory symptoms in participants, and compared subjective ratings of 
symptom experience with physiological referents. In both clinical and non-clinical samples, 
the correlation between subjective ratings and physiological measures was lower in those 
experiencing medically unexplained symptoms, indicating reduced interoceptive accuracy. 
Schaefer, Egloff, & Witthöft (2012) also found that higher symptom reports were associated 
with reduced interoceptive accuracy, assessed using heartbeat perception tasks. Although 
taken together these findings provide a somewhat mixed picture of the way in which bodily 
signals are perceived and processed in those with medically unexplained symptoms, a 
common theme across findings is that perception is distorted in some way. The exact nature 
and direction of distortions may depend on the manner in which constructs such as bodily 
awareness, perceptual amplification and interoceptive accuracy are conceptualised. Whilst 
terms are often used interchangeably, it is possible that they represent distinct processes that 
all contribute to a wider multi-dimensional concept (Mehling et al., 2009).  
 Further support for the suggestion that abnormalities in processing of body related 
perceptual information contribute to the mechanisms underlying medically unexplained 
symptoms is provided by studies investigating how information from multiple sensory 
sources is processed. Brown, Brunt, Poliakoff, & Lloyd (2010) found that high symptom 
reporters were more likely to experience illusory touch in the presence of a non-informative 
visual stimulus on the somatic signal detection task (SSDT), suggesting that medically 
unexplained symptoms are related to distortions in perceptual processing. The same group 
also report that high symptom reporters are less susceptible to the rubber hand illusion 
(Miles, Poliakoff, & Brown, 2011), a well-established body illusion whereby synchronous 
visuo-tactile stimulation of a rubber hand and the participants own, unseen, hand leads to 
embodiment of the rubber limb. Subjective reports revealed that high symptom reporters had 
a decreased illusion experience compared to the low symptom group and, furthermore, their 
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estimates of hand location (an objective measure of illusion susceptibility) displayed less drift 
towards the rubber hand. Since the illusion relies on the integration of sensory information 
from the visual, tactile and proprioceptive domains, altered experience of the illusion 
suggests the processing of sensory information in high symptom reporters may be different. 
For example, perceptual experience may be more driven by one sensory modality over 
another. The authors (Miles et al., 2011) suggest that bodily experience in high symptom 
reporters is more driven by “top-down” knowledge, whereby perceptions are more in line 
with cognitive representations. In the rubber hand illusion, this leads to a decrease in 
susceptibility due to the incompatibility of the rubber hand with existing representations of 
the body. 
An alternative explanation for these findings is that perceptual experience is actually more 
driven by “bottom-up” sensory information in high symptom reporters, specifically 
proprioception. If, as some of the preceding literature suggests, internal signals are more 
accurately perceived in this group, proprioceptive information may be more strongly 
weighted in comparison to other sensory modalities. During the rubber hand illusion, in 
which there is a discrepancy between visuo-tactile and proprioceptive information, an 
increased reliance on proprioception could lead to a more stable and accurate sense of body 
position and, subsequently, reduced illusory experience.  Whilst the paradigm used by Scholz 
et al. (2001) was designed to investigate proprioceptive muscle accuracy, no studies have 
investigated specifically how proprioceptive information is integrated in those susceptible to 
somatoform dissociation. Therefore the aim of the current experiment was to test the 
hypothesis that people scoring highly on the Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire would 
weight proprioceptive information more strongly under conditions of multisensory conflict. 
The MIRAGE system used in the current experiment provides a novel way to investigate the 
way in which multisensory information is processed in this group. The system enables the 
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experience of the self to be altered by changing sensory information relating to the 
participant’s own hand, as oppose to a fake or virtual hand (e.g. Miles et al, 2011). This set 
up provides insight into how incongruent sensory information about one’s own body is 
incorporated into the body representation. Even when sensory input clearly violates existing 
“top-down” knowledge about the body, manipulations can lead to significant changes in the 
way the body feels, which can have significant implications for many aspects of body 
perception, for example, the experience of pain (Preston & Newport, 2011). By manipulating 
sensory information about one’s own body, radical misperceptions can be induced, such as 
feeling as though one hand has completely disappeared (Newport & Gilpin, 2011). Such 
paradigms allow investigation into the weighting placed on different sensory modalities 
during multisensory integration. For example, Bellan et al. (2015) used the MIRAGE system 
to induce a discrepancy between visual and proprioceptive information to investigate how 
these inputs are integrated across time under conditions of sensory conflict. They observed 
that whilst initially vision is weighted more strongly than proprioception, over time, as the 
visual trace of the hand decays, the weighting given to proprioceptive information gradually 
increases. The current study used a paradigm adapted from Bellan et al. (2015) to investigate 
how visual and proprioceptive inputs are weighted (following the introduction of sensory 
conflict) in people reporting higher levels of somatoform dissociation. Participants completed 
a hand localisation task following the introduction of a covert discrepancy between the visual 
and proprioceptive location of the hand. Based on the findings of Scholz et al. (2001) and the 
apparently more stable sense of body position observed in the high symptom group in the 
Miles et al. (2011) study, it was hypothesised that high symptom reporters would be more 
accurate at locating the position of their hidden hand following manipulation. Since reliance 
on proprioceptive information has been shown to increase when visual information about 
hand position is degraded or occluded (Bellan et al., 2015; Mon-Williams, Wann, Jenkinson, 
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& Rushton, 1997; Welch & Warren, 1980), we also investigated perceptual drift across time 
in low and high symptom groups to further clarify the proprioceptive abilities in those 
susceptible to medically unexplained symptoms.  
 
Methods 
 
Participants 
Participants were recruited through posters and advertisements; the majority of those who 
took part were university students. Participants were invited to complete an online version of 
the Somatoform Dissociation Questionnaire (SDQ; Nijenhuis et al., 1996) which was used to 
assess experience of unexplained symptoms. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they have experienced each of 20 symptoms during the past year on a scale ranging 
from not at all (1) to extremely (5). For items given a rating of 2 or above, participants were 
asked to state whether or not a physician had identified the physical cause for the symptom, 
and if so, to give brief detail of this. If the participant detailed a physical cause that had been 
identified by a physician, the item was rescored as 1. Where participants had answered “yes” 
to the identification of a physical cause, but only provided a speculative description, the item 
was not rescored.  
Total scores on the SDQ range from 20 to 100. Patients with somatoform disorders typically 
score over 30 (Chu, 2011). Since scores on this measure in the normal population are highly 
positively skewed, the SDQ was administered as a screening questionnaire with the aim of 
ensuring that a roughly equal number of low and high symptom reporters were invited to 
complete the experimental session. As participants were recruited from a non-clinical sample, 
the cut-off ranges for classification as low or high symptom reporters were ≤ 21 and ≥ 26 
respectively. Scores of 30 or over have been taken to indicate high somatoform dissociation 
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(Maaranen et al., 2004), however in experimental research a cut-off point of 28 has 
commonly been adopted to classify participants as high scorers (e.g. Brown et al., 2010; 
Miles et al., 2011). The cut-off for the high group in the current study was slightly lower than 
previous experimental studies have used. However, we observed significant positive skew in 
SDQ scores, with fewer than 15% of all participants completing the SDQ (N=80) scoring 28 
or above. Furthermore, since the study aimed to capture somatoform dissociation in 
nonclinical populations, the decision was taken to adopt a revised cut-off point for the high 
group of 26 for the high group, which enabled elevated symptom scores representative of this 
population to be captured.  Fifty-five participants scored within the cut-off ranges and were 
invited to complete the experimental session; 34 of whom took part. Three participants were 
excluded from the analysis; two due to the presence of outlier data in the incongruent 
condition (>2 standard deviations below the mean), and one due to a substantially higher 
SDQ-score than the rest of the sample (>5 standard deviations above the mean), This resulted 
in a sample size of 31 participants, split into a low-SDQ group (N=17, 8 male) and a high-
SDQ group (N=14, 8 male). Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for participants by group. 
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
Questionnaire measures 
Since perceptual amplification is thought to be relevant for experience of somatoform 
symptoms, participants completed the Somatosensory Amplification Scale (SSAS; Barsky et 
al., 1990), which measures the tendency to experience amplification of normal sensations. 
The State-trait anxiety inventory (STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1983) was used to measure 
anxiety, which has been linked to both increased symptom reporting and somatosensory 
amplification (Duddu et al., 2006).  
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Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted using the MIRAGE system (Newport, Preston, Pearce, & 
Holton, 2009) controlled using LabVIEW (National Instruments LabVIEW version 2010). 
MIRAGE is a mediated reality system that allows the participant to view a real-time video 
image of their own hands in the same apparent physical location as their real hands. A camera 
records a live video image (delay of ~ 16ms) of the work surface, which is fed to a display 
screen and reflected to the participant by a mirror suspended equidistant between the display 
screen above and work surface below. The angle of the camera is such that the hands in the 
image are presented in the same spatial location as the user’s actual hands, thus giving the 
participant the impression that he or she is viewing their hands directly. Custom software 
allows the size, appearance and location of the hand to be manipulated in various ways, 
resulting in incongruous sensory information from different modalities and/or conflict 
between sensory information and “top-down” knowledge. Previous experimental 
manipulations have involved creating the feeling that the participant has extra hands 
(Newport, Pearce, & Preston, 2010), extended fingers (Preston & Newport, 2011) and 
creating the illusion that the participant’s hand has disappeared (Newport & Gilpin, 2011). 
 
Procedure 
The participant was seated at the MIRAGE device with both hands placed on the work 
surface. A black cloth, covering both shoulders and arms, was loosely fastened round the 
participant’s neck so that the angle and location at which the hands entered MIRAGE could 
not be seen. The experiment required the participant to judge the location of their seen or 
unseen hands following exposure to congruent or incongruent visuo-proprioceptive sensory 
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information about the location of their hands. Judgements were made under four conditions: 
Congruent Seen (CS), Congruent Unseen Inner (CUI), Congruent Unseen Outer (CUO) and 
Incongruent Unseen (IU). In the congruent conditions, the seen location of both hands was 
congruent with the actual location of the hands. At the start of each condition, the participant 
watched as the experimenter positioned the participant’s hands either side of the body 
midline. The distance between each index finger and the midline was 58.5mm for conditions 
Congruent Seen and Congruent Unseen Inner and 153.5mm in condition Congruent Unseen 
Outer. These two distances corresponded to the seen and actual location of the hand, 
respectively, in the Incongruent Unseen condition (see below), and were included to check 
for any potential differences in accuracy depending on hand eccentricity. In condition 
Congruent Seen, included to verify task understanding, the hands remained visible for the 
localisation judgements. In Congruent Unseen Inner and Congruent Unseen Outer, a blank 
(black) image replaced and covered the image of the hands before participants completed the 
judgements.  
In the incongruent condition, the image of the hands was manipulated such that the seen 
location of the right hand was incongruent with its actual location (note: the seen and actual 
locations of the left hand remained congruent). This was achieved using an adaptation 
procedure similar to that used by Newport & Gilpin (2011) and Bellan et al. (2015). Three 
thin blue bars were superimposed on the outer edges and centre of the viewed workspace, 
leaving the participant’s hands visible in the spaces between (see Figure 1a). Over the course 
of 25 seconds the bars expanded, reducing the space in which the hands could be seen (Figure 
1b). Keeping their hands and forearms elevated ~5cm above the work surface, participants 
were instructed to ensure that their hands did not touch the blue bars on either side and keep 
them visible within the space between as it reduced. During this procedure, the image of the 
right hand was manipulated to move slowly leftwards at a rate of 4.5mm/s meaning that, in 
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order to keep the hand visible and in the same place visually, participants had to move their 
hand rightwards at the same rate (Figure 1c). This resulted in a discrepancy between the seen 
and actual location of the right hand, such that at the end of the procedure, the right hand was 
seen to be 11.25cm to the left of its actual location. Throughout this time the image of the left 
hand slowly oscillated laterally, but the final seen location of the hand was congruent with its 
actual location. The movement of the right hand happens so slowly that it is unnoticeable; no 
participant has reported conscious awareness of the visuo-proprioceptive discrepancy in 
previous experiments (Bellan et al., 2015; Newport & Gilpin, 2011). After the 25-second 
adaptation procedure, the experimenter guided the participant’s hands to rest on the work 
surface. The hand image was then replaced by a blank image (as in Congruent Unseen Inner 
and Congruent Unseen Outer) before judgements were completed. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Localisation judgements were completed immediately following the occlusion of the 
hand image in the unseen conditions (Congruent Unseen Inner, Congruent Unseen Outer and 
Incongruent Unseen; in Congruent Seen, judgements were made immediately after 
positioning of the hands). Participants were asked to say “stop” when a red arrow moving 
horizontally across the image was directly above where they felt their index finger to be, 
aiming for the middle of the index finger (see Figure 1d). The arrow travelled either from left 
to right or from right to left. The appearance of the arrow and the onset and offset of its 
movement were controlled by the experimenter, although the speed of its movement was 
automatic so that the arrow moved smoothly and at the same pace for all participants across 
all conditions. If immediately after saying “stop” the participant felt that the arrow had not 
stopped in the correct location, they could instruct the experimenter to manually adjust the 
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position of the arrow backwards or forwards until it came to the desired location. The arrow 
disappeared promptly after the response was given and the experimenter manually recorded 
the x-axis coordinate of the arrow location as the measure of perceived finger location. One 
set of judgements consisted of four trials – one trial for each travelling direction (left-
right/right-left) for each finger (left/right) – and took approximately one minute to complete. 
The order of trials in each set was randomised. Before each trial, the experimenter specified 
which index finger the participant should judge and which direction the arrow would travel 
from. For conditions Congruent Seen, Congruent Unseen Inner and Congruent Unseen Outer, 
participants completed one set of judgements. In condition Incongruent Unseen, participants 
completed 7 sets of judgements separated by 10-second intervals, across a time period 
totalling approximately 8 minutes. The hands remained hidden throughout all intervals and 
judgement trials. All participants completed the Congruent Seen condition first, to ensure that 
they understood the task, followed by the Congruent Unseen Inner, Congruent Unseen Outer 
and Incongruent Unseen conditions. In all conditions, the experimenter recorded the actual 
location of each index finger immediately before the judgements began. Participants were 
instructed to keep their hands still throughout the judgements and were specifically asked not 
to move their index finger to prevent any possibility of proprioceptive updating.    
 
Analysis 
The x-axis coordinate of the actual hand location and each judgement were recorded in pixels 
and converted into cm (1 pixel = 0.73mm). For each set of judgements in each condition, a 
mean localisation estimate was calculated for each hand (averaged across arrow direction). 
The actual hand location was subtracted from the estimate to provide a measure of 
localisation error. Right hand values were multiplied by minus one so that, rather than 
reflecting error to the left or right of actual hand location, the localisation error scale reflected 
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error towards or away from the body midline. Positive error values indicate estimates towards 
the body midline, while negative error values indicate estimates away from the body midline. 
Thus in condition Incongruent Unseen, since the seen location of the hand is closer to the 
body midline than the actual location of the hand, positive estimates indicate a shift in 
perceived hand location towards the location of the seen hand. 
To investigate accuracy of hand localisation between the groups in the congruent conditions, 
a 3-way mixed ANOVA (3x2x2) was conducted with the factors condition (Congruent Seen, 
Congruent Unseen Inner, Congruent Unseen Outer), hand (left, right) and SDQ group (low, 
high). A linear mixed model was used to investigate accuracy across time in condition 
Incongruent Unseen. Mixed models provide an alternative to the traditional ANOVA 
approach for analysing repeated measures data. ANOVA requires data from different 
conditions to be independent. However, collecting multiple measurements per participant 
across different conditions violates this assumption, since it introduces potential correlation 
between data points. Repeated measures ANOVA deals with this by assuming that the 
variance and covariance is the same across all repeated measures. Alternatively, mixed 
models control for dependence through the addition of random factors. Random factors give 
structure to the error term of the model and enable individual differences to be controlled for 
(Winter, 2013). Contrary to ANOVA, mixed models yield accurate results for unbalanced 
designs, and furthermore are better able to deal with missing values in the data. They also 
allow time to be modelled as a continuous variable, reducing the number of post- hoc 
comparisons that are required compared to if time is treated as categorical as is the typical 
approach in ANOVA.  
To investigate whether incongruent visuo-proprioceptive information for the right hand 
affected localisation error, and whether or not this changed over time in each group, a linear 
mixed model was constructed using the mixed function in the R package afex (Singmann, 
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Bolker, & Westfall, 2015). Hand, Time (8 minute period from first judgement to seventh 
judgement) and SDQ group were entered as fixed factors and participant was entered as a 
random factor. The model included a random intercept for participant and random slopes for 
Hand and Time. Furthermore, because of the relatively small sample size in each SDQ group, 
a Bayesian analysis was conducted using the R package BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 
2015) in order to quantify the evidence for the null hypothesis compared to the alternative 
hypothesis (BF01) for statistical tests involving the factor SDQ group. A BF01 value of 10 
indicates that the observed data were 10 times more likely to occur under the null hypothesis 
than the alternative. 
 
Results 
 
ANOVA for congruent conditions 
Although there were an unbalanced number of participants in each SDQ group, neither Box’s 
M test of equality of covariance matrices nor Levene’s test of equality of error variances were 
significant at the p = .05 level. The data met all other assumptions of repeated measures 
ANOVA. Overall, accuracy was very high in all congruent conditions. Table 2 displays the 
mean localisation error for each hand in each condition for each SDQ group. Localisation 
error did not differ across conditions, F(2,58) = 1.80, p = .174; hands, F(1,29) = .716, p = 
.404, or between SDQ groups, F(1,29) = .736, p = .398,  and there were no interactions 
between any of the three factors (all p > .1). As predicted, both groups remained highly 
accurate in locating both hands when vision of the hands was removed, and, importantly, 
distance from the body midline (Congruent Unseen Inner vs. Congruent Unseen Outer) did 
not affect localisation error. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Linear mixed model for condition Incongruent Unseen 
Mean localisation errors in the Incongruent Unseen condition are shown in Figure 2. The 
presence of incongruent visuo-proprioceptive information for the right hand had a significant 
effect on localisation error, as evidenced by the main effect of hand, F(1,40.12)=251.51, p 
<.001). Error values were significantly higher for the right hand compared to the left hand, 
with error in the direction of the seen location of the right hand. Furthermore, there was a 
significant effect of time, F(1,29.00) = 6.98, p = .01, although the interaction between hand 
and time was not significant, F(1,335.42) = 1.38, p = .24.  
Crucially, the results also revealed that SDQ group did not have a significant effect on 
localisation error. The main effect of SDQ group was not significant, F(1, 29.01) = .07, p = 
.79, BF01 = 2.16 ± 13.24%, nor were the two-way interactions between SDQ group and hand, 
F(1, 40.12) = 1.40, p = .24, BF01 = 0.88 ± 14.07%, and SDQ group and time, F(1,29.00) = 
.08, p = .78, BF01 = 10.63 ± 17.25%. Furthermore, the three-way interaction between SDQ 
group, hand and time was not significant, F(1, 335.42) = .80, p = .37, BF01 = 16.88 ± 22.24%. 
 [Figure 2 about here] 
 
Questionnaire Scores 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to establish whether somatosensory 
amplification (SSAS) or trait anxiety (STAI-T) scores differed between SDQ groups.  
The high-SDQ group had a significantly higher mean SSAS score than the low-SDQ group 
(32.15 vs. 27.71), t(28) = -2.11, p = .045. STAI-T scores did not differ between groups, t(29) 
= -.40, p = .69.  
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A correlation analysis revealed no relationship between SSAS scores and mean localisation 
error (across all times) in the incongruent condition, r(29) = -.05, p = .77, therefore the 
analysis was not re-run with SSAS as a covariate.   
 
Discussion 
 
To examine the hypothesis that there is a relationship between heightened body 
awareness and somatoform dissociation in a sub-clinical population, proprioceptive 
localisation and visuo-proprioceptive integration were assessed through hand localisation 
judgements under congruent and incongruent sensory conditions. Similar patterns of 
responding were observed in both high- and low- scoring SDQ groups across all conditions. 
In the congruent conditions, for which visual information regarding the positions of the hands 
corresponded to their actual locations, all participants gave accurate estimates of hand 
position, even when the hands were hidden from view. When the visual information 
regarding the position of the right hand was displaced, rendering visual and proprioceptive 
information incongruent, localisation accuracy was significantly worse. Both groups initially 
perceived the right hand to be approximately two-thirds towards the visual representation of 
the hand (away from the real hand location). Furthermore, in the continued absence of visual 
information, it might be expected that the felt position of the hand would drift back towards 
the real location of the hand more rapidly in the high-SDQ group if that group had greater 
awareness of bodily sensations. However, for both the high- and low- SDQ groups, hand 
estimates remained consistently inaccurate, drifting only slightly towards the real position of 
the hand and consistently being mis-localised as closer to the visual hand than to the real 
hand for 8 minutes. The results therefore do not support the notion that those experiencing 
somatoform dissociative symptoms have increased body awareness or heightened sensitivity 
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to body-related stimuli in terms of proprioceptive position sense. Indeed, the high-scoring 
group demonstrated normal proprioception, performing in a similar fashion to the low-
scoring group.  
This observation dismisses two potential alternative explanations for the findings of 
Miles et al. (2011) that previously remained unexplored. In that study, participants reporting 
higher levels of somatoform dissociation (SDQ ≥ 28) were found to be less susceptible to the 
rubber hand illusion, identifying less with the rubber hand and showing less proprioceptive 
drift than the low-scoring group. The authors suggested that this finding might be a result of 
perceptions being more driven by top-down factors, such as limb appearance, in the high-
SDQ group. As the rubber hand, while relatively life-like, was obviously not a real arm, 
people more in tune with top-down cognitive knowledge would be less likely to embody the 
limb, while those driven more by bottom-up sensory information (congruent vision and 
touch) would embody the limb more. However, this finding could be accounted for by two 
alternative explanations. On one hand, it may be that the high-SDQ group had a greater 
awareness of the real position of their hidden limb, through increased body awareness or 
more precise proprioception (Scholz et al., 2001). In the rubber hand illusion, increased 
proprioceptive awareness could result in this sense being weighted more strongly than visual 
and tactile inputs during multisensory integration. In this case, the visuotactile synchrony 
observed at the rubber hand may be insufficient to override the felt position of the limb, 
resulting in less proprioceptive drift towards the fake limb as well as a greater subjective 
awareness that the fake limb could not be theirs due to its incorrect location. Thus, rather than 
perception in the high-SDQ group being driven by top-down influences, reduced illusion 
experience in this group may actually reflect a tendency for perception to be driven by a 
specific mode of “bottom-up” sensory information, namely proprioception. On the other 
hand, it may be the case that those in the high-SDQ group are poorer at integrating 
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multisensory information. The rubber hand illusion depends on the successful integration of 
visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals (Makin, Holmes, & Ehrsson, 2008) and a failure to 
bind together the seen and felt position of the hand (which are in different locations in the 
standard illusion) would reduce or eradicate the illusion.  Somatoform dissociation implies a 
lack of integration for, or a disconnection between the processing of, cognitive and perceptual 
information related to the body (Nijenhuis, 2000) which, potentially, could extend to the 
integration and interpretation of basic multisensory signals. Therefore, the reduced illusion 
experience observed in those reporting a higher number of somatoform symptoms in the 
Miles et al. (2011) study may therefore indicate a failure to integrate multisensory 
information efficiently. 
However, by demonstrating comparable performance across both the low- and high- 
SDQ groups, the results of the current study appear to rule out both of these alternative 
explanations. In the incongruent condition, the high-SDQ group did not show an initial 
increase in accuracy in localising the right hand, nor did their estimates become any more 
accurate over time, compared to the low-SDQ group, providing no evidence that high-SDQ 
scorers have a heightened sense of limb position via proprioception under conditions of 
visuo-proprioceptive conflict. In addition to having normal proprioception, the high-SDQ 
group demonstrate the ability to integrate visual and proprioceptive information, evidenced 
by the fact that their localisation judgements of the right hand in the incongruent condition lie 
between the seen (visual) and actual (proprioceptive) location of the hand. Furthermore, the 
weighting given to visual and proprioceptive information is comparable across both groups. 
Although the group mean differences point towards a slight tendency for the high-SDQ group 
to weight visual information more strongly than proprioceptive information, this difference 
was not statistically significant, and by the end of the judgement period in the incongruent 
condition both the low- and high-SDQ groups gave approximately equal weighting to visual 
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and proprioceptive information (group mean weighting towards visual information at final 
judgement: low = 60.38%, high = 63.08%).  
Taken in tandem, these two observations are a clear sign that, in terms of 
proprioception at least, the sensory processing of those who might be susceptible to 
somatoform disorders or medically unexplained symptoms is not characterised by increased 
reliance on “bottom-up” sensory information arising from the body, nor a failure to integrate 
multisensory inputs. Instead, a greater weighting for top-down information seems to be the 
more plausible explanation for the Miles et al. (2011) study, which is in line with the model 
proposed by Brown (2004, 2006) suggesting misperceptions in those experiencing 
unexplained symptoms arise due to overreliance on top-down representations. 
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the existence of abnormalities in 
perceptual processing that have been suggested to be a potential mechanism through which 
medically unexplained symptoms emerge and are maintained (Rief & Barsky, 2005). The 
tendency to experience amplification of normal bodily sensations, interpreting innocuous 
sensory input as abnormal or harmful, along with abnormal attentional focus on these 
sensations may contribute to somatisation and the perception of disease in both clinical and 
subclinical populations (Barsky & Borus, 1999; Houtveen, Rietveld, & De Geus, 2003). 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the high-SDQ group reported significantly more 
somatosensory amplification than the low-SDQ group, which is in line with observations in 
previous studies (Brown, Poliakoff, & Kirkman, 2007; Miles et al., 2011). However, 
somatosensory amplification did not correlate with localisation error in the incongruent 
condition, suggesting that general perceptual amplification does not imply heightened 
awareness of proprioceptive signals. Nonetheless, it remains possible that this could 
contribute to maintenance of somatoform symptoms in clinical groups; it may be that 
abnormalities in the processing of sensory signals are a consequence, rather than a cause, of 
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persistent symptom experience, perhaps driven by other factors associated with increased 
perceptual amplification such as anxiety or depression (Duddu et al., 2006). Future research 
should focus on understanding the relationship between sensory integration, perceptual 
amplifcation and somatoform dissociation, in order to clairfy the processes underlying 
persistent symptom experience. This may also shed light on important differences between 
subclincal and clincal experience of somatoform dissociation. 
Since the sample size in each of the SDQ groups was relatively small, a Bayes factor 
analysis was conducted to further investigate how strongly the data supported each null 
model over the alternative. For models involving the factor Time the analyses showed strong 
support for the null model (no interaction with SDQ group), indicating that the null findings 
were not due to insufficient evidence. The Bayes factors for the main effect of SDQ group 
and hand by SDQ group interaction were small, suggesting that the data do not strongly 
support either the null or alternative hypothesis. This indicates that a larger sample size is 
required to quantify these effects, and as such the present findings should be interpretted with 
some caution. However, when considering this in relation to the group means presented in 
Figure 2, it appears likely that any change in the effects due to increased sample size would 
likely be in the opposite direction to that predicted; that is, the high SDQ group may show a 
stonger weighting for vision. Although speculative, such a finding would still support the 
conclusion of the current study that those reporting more somatoform symptoms do not show 
heightened awareness for proprioception. However, it would point towards abrnomal 
multisensory integration of vision and proprioception in this group, therefore further research 
with a larger sample is necessary to clarify the effects. 
While the current results do not point to an over-reliance or higher-perception of body 
position sense in people scoring highly on somatoform dissociation, they do not rule out the 
possibility that normal proprioceptive signals are subjectively perceived in an aberrant 
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manner in these individuals. Although perception and integration of basic sensory signals 
(vision and proprioception) appears to be intact in those reporting somatoform dissociation, 
integration failures may occur further along in the processing stream, when sensory 
information needs to be combined with higher order representations. Indeed, this in line with 
proposed accounts of dissociative experiences such as the out-of-body experience, which are 
thought to arise due to a disintegration of low-level multisensory inputs and high-level self-
processing at the temporo-parietal junction (Blanke & Arzy, 2005), and also fits with 
suggestions that dissociative experiences in depersonalisation arise due to impairment in the 
integration of perception with emotional experience (Sierra & David, 2011). Whilst these 
accounts focus on higher-order disruptions in multisensory integration, importantly, there 
actually appears to be little research examining how exteroceptive and proprioceptive signals 
are perceived and integrated in people experiencing anomalous/dissociative experiences. A 
study by Braithwaite, Broglia, & Watson (2014) investigated how visual, proprioceptive and 
tactile signals are integrated during the rubber hand illusion in people reporting anomalous 
body experiences (ABEs), finding evidence for differences in temporal integration of 
multisensory signals, and psychophysiological components of the illusion, in those reporting 
more ABEs. As previously discussed, Miles et al. (2011) investigate this in those reporting 
somatoform dissociation, and the current study also sheds light on the way in which 
multisensory information is processed in this group. However, further research should look at 
similar processes in groups displaying other types of dissociation, such as the out-of-body 
experience, in order to fully understand the nature of the disruptions in multisensory 
integration that appear to be characteristic of dissociative experiences. 
Finally, it is worth noting for how long localisation of the hidden hand remained 
inaccurate. It was expected that the felt location of the hand would drift back to the location 
of the real hand as proprioceptive position sense was updated in the absence of vision. 
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However, the spatial representation of the unseen hand remained remarkably stable, staying 
more than 6 cm to the left of the real hand and drifting only around 0.5 cm over the final 7 
minutes of visual occlusion. This is interesting because it shows that while body 
representation is very malleable when provided with new sensory information, it is also 
remarkably stable when not. Such discrepancy might help to explain some of the aberrant 
experiences observed in clinical populations such as complex regional pain syndrome 
(CRPS) and following stoke. If rapid cortical reorganisation of body representation, as a 
result of trauma to the brain or body, is followed by slow, incomplete or incorrect 
recalibration, due to maladaptive processes in CRPS or sensory loss/brain damage in stroke, 
then the stability of those aberrant representations might persist longer than would be 
expected such that limbs may become subjectively lost or alien.  
The amount of drift observed for the right hand in the incongruent condition in the 
current study is less than the amount reported by Bellan et al. (2015), who observed drift of 
approximately 2.5cm over the course of three minutes, compared to just under 2cm over the 
course of 8 minutes in the current study. It seems logical to expect more, or at least as much, 
drift across an 8-minute period compared to a 3-minute period. One difference between the 
two studies that may account for this finding is that in the current study, participants made 
estimates of both the left hand and right hand location, with left hand judgements potentially 
providing an anchor for right hand judgements. Alternatively, it may be that judgements in 
the Bellan study would have stabilised had they been taken over a longer time period.  
 In summary, this experiment investigated the proprioceptive position sense and visuo-
proprioceptive integration in a group scoring highly on the somatoform dissociation 
questionnaire, observing no differences in proprioceptive accuracy or visuo-proprioceptive 
integration, suggesting that proprioception and sensory integration in high-scorers is normal. 
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The study, therefore, does not support the notion that somatoform dissociation is underpinned 
by the amplification of proprioceptive signals. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for age (years), SDQ scores, SSAS and STAI-T scores for 
participants split by SDQ group. 
 SDQ group Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation 
Age Low 
High  
18.61 
19.59 
45.04 
29.12 
27.67 
23.35 
8.68 
2.83 
SDQ score Low 
High 
20 
26 
21 
39 
20.24 
28.93 
.44 
3.45 
SSAS score Low 
High 
16 
26 
42 
38 
27.71 
32.15 
7.44 
3.93 
STAI-T 
score 
Low 
High 
22 
31 
60 
68 
37.94 
39.36 
10.02 
9.43 
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Table 2: Mean (SD) localisation error values (cm) in the congruent 
conditions 
Hand SDQ group CS CUI CUO 
Left  Low 
High 
-.04 (.19) 
-.05 (.20) 
.51 (1.24)  
.60 (1.43) 
.73 (1.40)  
-.28 (1.20) 
Right  Low 
High 
-.01 (.21)  
-.02 (.24) 
. 35(1.18)  
..12 (1.53) 
.05 (1.87)  
-.10 (1.94) 
	   34 
 
Figure 1. (a) The adaptation procedure began with the seen and real locations of the right 
hand in alignment; (b) Superimposed blue bars slowly expanded to constrict the space around 
the hand over the course of the adaptation procedure while, at the same time and without the 
participant’s awareness, the image of the right hand moved slowly leftwards so that in order 
to keep the hand visible between the blue bars, the participant had to move their real hand 
rightwards creating a discrepancy between the seen and real location of the hand - note the 
misalignment of the seen right hand and the participant’s real arm compared to (a). A bib 
occluded the participant’s view of their arms during the actual experiment. (c) The 
participant’s hands on the MIRAGE work surface from the experimenter’s viewpoint. The 
yellow arrow indicates the direction of movement for the right hand during adaptation. (d) 
Following occlusion of the hand and work surface the participant indicated the felt location 
of their real hand by saying “Stop” when a moving arrow was in line with where they felt 
their index finger to be. 
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Figure 2. Mean localisation error in the incongruent condition at each judgement point (seven 
across an 8 minute period) for each SDQ group split by hand. Dashed line at y=0 indicates 
actual location of the hand, dashed line at y=11.25 indicates seen location of the right hand 
(left hand seen at actual location). Error bars = 95% CI. 
